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1Introduction
On January 16, 1979, Reza Shah Pahlavi boarded a plane and left Iran. The mobilization 
of nearly ten percent of the population had led to mass protests and demonstrations, precursors to 
the outbreak of revolution (Fatemi p. 48).  The Shah never returned. Instead, a new government 
was erected and the nation was renamed the “Islamic Republic of Iran.” The success of the 
revolution in ousting the Shah has been contributed to many sources, including the Shah’s own 
westernization policies which alienated the masses (Mirsepassi-Ashtiani, p.60). However, the 
influence of one man is consistently regarded as a source of revolutionary fuel. The most 
influential figure of the revolution was Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, known by his most 
adamant supporters as Imam Khomeini.1
Educated in the religious sciences from a young age, Khomeini never strayed from the 
path of devotion.  His studies led to a personal interest in philosophy, poetry and mystical Islam, 
interests which would surprise many unaware of his personal preferences (Moin pp. 28-29). At 
the end of his life, however, Khomeini would not be remembered by most for his skill in 
composition. By some, he would be hailed an icon of freedom, legitimate authority and divine 
approval. By others, including many who at one time believed he would be a solution to the 
hardships of the Iranian people, Khomeini would gain a title of infamy.
This analysis explores the Iranian communal identity and the facets thereof which 
Khomeini drew upon in his call for revolution. I will begin with an assessment of the diversity of 
                                                          
1 “Imam” is a title given to religious leaders within the Muslim community. In Shia’ Islam, the title of Imam is 
generally reserved for leaders of the community who are believed to be divinely appointed and infallible. Although 
Ruhollah Khomeini’s official title is, in western translation, “Ayatollah,” his leaders grew to see him as a divinely 
appointed leader of Islam for the Iranian people, thereafter giving him the title of “Imam Khomeini.” It should be 
noted that this title differs significantly from that given to the twelve Imams of Twelver Shi’ism, prophesied of by 
the prophet Muhammad. In the case of the latter, these twelve Imams take on a role comparable to that of a Christian 
prophet in that they are believed to be representatives and messengers of God set apart for a divine purpose and 
mission. 
2Iran. The implications of such vast diversity will be reviewed through the examination of a 
communal identity, with a focus throughout this piece on the religious communities of Iran. Two 
specific elements of the Iranian communal identity will be the focus of this piece: the quest for 
justice and the significance of martyrdom.
Justice will be linked to the Iranian identity through a discussion of the roots of justice in 
Zoroastrianism and its development within the doctrine of Shia’ Islam. The importance of Shia’ 
Islam on the Iranian communal identity will also be examined. Additionally, the theme of justice 
within contemporary Iranian literature will be reviewed through poetry and prose. The novel 
which will be analyzed in this portion of the paper is Simin Daneshvar’s Savushun, a prominent 
piece of contemporary Persian literature. In an effort to remain concise, the summary of the 
novel will be brief.
The presence of martyrdom in the Iranian communal identity will be discussed through 
an examination of martyrdom in the Shia’ narrative. Specifically, the martyrdom of Imam 
Hossein will be considered as a defining element of Shia’ theology.  In addition to an analysis of 
martyrdom through religion, this second facet of the communal identity will be explored through 
historic and contemporary Iranian literature. Daneshvar’s Savushun will provide evidence for the 
presence of martyrdom in contemporary Iranian art. In addition to Savushun, the story of 
“Siavash” from Abu I’Qasim Ferdowsi’s The Shahnameh, or The Book of Kings, will be 
examined. The narratives of these stories will be considered in connection with the martyrdom of 
Imam Hossein. 
To conclude the discussion of martyrdom in the Iranian communal identity, 
contemporary rituals related to martyrdom will be reviewed. These rituals will demonstrate the
3impact the death of Imam Hossein has had on the Shia’, and by extension, Iranian identity. These 
rituals will also offer insight into the persistence of the themes of justice and martyrdom in 
contemporary Iran. 
I will thereafter assess Ayatollah Khomeini’s efforts of mobilization and calls for a 
change in national leadership. The presence of justice and martyrdom as elements of Khomeini’s 
message will be considered relying upon Khomeini’s own speeches, in large part, to clarify his 
views. Within Khomeini’s messages, the use of justice and martyrdom as fuels for revolution 
will be explored. Khomeini’s ability to relate to his audience will be made clear through his 
understanding of the historical and religious elements which have helped to shape the communal 
identity of the Iranian people and the use of these elements in his calls for action. 
4[CHAPTER 1] IRANIAN IDENTITY
The Diverse Makeup of the Iranian Identity
Over the past four thousand years, the land now known as Iran has been home to millions 
of ethnically, culturally, religiously and socially diverse peoples (Amanolahi p. 37). It has known 
“occupation” under the rule of major empires, such as the Abbasids and Mongols, and later by 
Russian, British and American imperialists. The land has witnessed mass migration and has been 
a shelter for thousands of refugees during major world crises, with one of the largest refugee  
groups hailing from Afghanistan over the last decade (Rajaee p. 45). The ever changing 
landscape of Iran continues to establish the nation as an evolving center of diversity. Thus, it 
needs be that the determination of a shared Iranian identity begins with an examination of the 
wide range of contemporary settlers.
The complexities of Iranian identity start with the factor of ethnicity. Although the largest 
ethnic group is the Persians, several other ethnicities are represented. Second to the Persians in 
population size are Azeris at sixteen percent of the population, followed by Kurds, Lurs, 
Balochis, Arabs and Turkmans (Amanolahi pp. 39-40). The prevalence of ethnic diversity has 
led to the establishment of communities based largely on ethnicity. For example, throughout the 
northwestern corner of Iran, Azerbaijani communities are prevalent, whereas the Kordestan 
province is primarily home to individuals of Kurdish descent (Amanolahi p. 39). Also important 
to note when considering the diversity of communities in Iran is the presence of refugee 
neighborhoods. In particular, there has been a significant rise in the presence of Afghani and 
Arab refugees hailing from war-torn nations in recent years (UN Refugee Agency).2 In light of 
                                                          
2 According to the UN Refugee Agency, Iran is host to “one of the largest and most protracted refugee populations 
in the world.” The latest statistics hold that the number of registered refugees in Iran is just under one million. A 
majority of these refugees come from Afghanistan. There is also a significant refugee population hailing from Iraq. 
5all groups of contemporary settlers, recent figures place the Iranian population at just under 
eighty million, making Iran one of the most populated nations in the Middle East (United 
Nations).
A second element of identity, which will be of the upmost importance throughout this 
analysis, is that of religious association. Almost exclusively, with numbers at or above ninety-
eight percent, the Iranian population identify as Muslims. Specifically, a majority of Iranians 
self-identify as followers of Shia’ Islam (Amanolahi p.39). It should be noted that the statistics 
revealing religious affiliation say nothing to the degree of devotion exhibited by individuals 
within the Iranian society. From that perspective, personal religious preference can vary 
significantly from one individual to the next. Therefore, it should be maintained that religious 
association, especially in the case of a “theocracy,” may for many be more of a title than an 
element shaping one’s existence. While many Iranians may, in practice, fit the mold of a 
secularist, the impact of religion on contemporary Iranian culture, as will be examined 
throughout this piece, is clear. Thus, religion becomes a facet of identity even for the non-
religious due to its presence in the public realm through celebrations, communal gatherings and 
popular literature. 
Another facet of Iranian diversity, and one important to the makeup of both individual 
and communal identities, is that of language. Just over fifty-five percent of the population speaks
Persian as their first language, the single official language of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Over 
ten separate languages follow Persian in number, ranging from Arabic to the Gilaki and Turkish 
dialects (Amanolahi p.39). Several scholars have devoted their research to studying the impact of 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Most refugees live in urban areas, but economic sanctions against Iran and skyrocketing inflation rates have made it 
even more difficult for refugees to maintain a suitable standard of living. The UN is working alongside NGOs, such 
as  Iranian Refugee Amnesty Network, to provide aid for refugees seeking to return to their home countries. 
6language upon the creation and maintenance of the Iranian identity. While the validity of these 
analyses is made clear through the quantitative and qualitative evidences of scholarly research, 
this analysis will not focus on language as an element of identity.
In addition to the necessary consideration of widespread diversity, it must be noted that 
the Iranian identity is not static. In her book, Missing Persians, Nasrin Rahimieh of the 
University of California, Irvine, describes the Iranian identity as a concept which “changes 
meaning and parameters over the course of time.” (p.2). Like the people of Iran who undergo 
cultural, religious and political transformations, so too does communal and shared identity 
experience continual evolution. While historical factors will be considered in the creation of 
contemporary Iranian identity, the core of this work will reflect Iranian identity throughout the 
twentieth century. That is not to say that certain elements of identity have not persisted through 
the ages; to the contrary, there are many elements, such as the Persian language, which have 
proved to withstand the test of time. Even these elements, however, have to some degree evolved 
within themselves and should not be considered unchanging facets of identity. 
The Iranian Communal Identity
I will explore the Iranian communal identity primarily, though not exclusively, through
the perspective of the religious, focusing on elements which create a sense of “oneness” amongst 
the Shia’ community. Ahmad Ashraf of Columbia University describes Iran’s national identity as 
influenced by religion in the following manner: 
The traditional religious groups have advocated a primarily Islamic identity, viewing the Iranian 
nation as a segment of the "nation of Islam…” This Islamic-Iranian conception of Iranian identity 
represents an attempt at bridging the sacred and the secular, tradition and modernity… (p. 162).
7In regards to the revolution the many Iranians sought, as Ashraf expressed, to bridge “…tradition 
and modernity.” Echoing this sentiment, French philosopher Michael Foucault “described the 
Iranian Revolution as ‘the first postmodern revolution of our time’” (Mirsepassi-Ashtiani p.51).
The reality of this approach is particularly evident in an exploration of the resulting Constitution
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, ratified by ninety-eight percent of voters (Islamic Republic of 
Iran Constitution, Article 1). Whereas the Constitution does affirm the religious affiliation of the 
nation, that of an Islamic Republic, it also outlines the rights of the people as constituents to a 
republic model of government. An example of these rights as administered by the Constitution
can be seen in Article Six, which states:
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the affairs of the country must be administered on the 
basis of public opinion expressed by the means of elections, including the election of the 
President, the representatives of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and the members of 
councils, or by means of referenda in matters specified in other articles of this 
Constitution (Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution). 
Khomeini called not for a fundamental state, but for an Islamic Republic suited for eventual 
leadership under the Imam. As can be seen in the Article Six, the republic was designed to reflect 
the preferences of the people. Though Khomeini sought a return to “true” Islam, he spoke of the 
establishment of an entirely new, untested system of governance – a model like the Islamic 
Republic had not been known in the contemporary era in the Middle East (Khomeini p. 49). It is 
with the understanding of the revolution as a means of the establishment of a new, modern state
that the fuels of change, rooted in the Iranian identity, will be examined.
Two elements of the Iranian identity which this analysis will explore are justice and the 
significance of martyrdom. In an examination of identity focused on the aforementioned shared 
factors a disclaimer is necessary: this analysis in no way attempts to provide an all-inclusive 
summation of the Iranian people. Even in a nation less diverse than Iran, attempting to do so 
8would be an impossible task. The strains which allow for an application of the term “oneness” 
may be few and far between. Therefore, the exploration of identity to follow is founded on an 
understanding that commonalities, even if applicable to most, will not apply to all. There are 
bound to be exceptions to every argument founded upon a qualitative observation of humankind. 
In this way, communal understanding must be accepted as shared elements of an identity much 
larger than that of the individual, with the realization that this analysis should not be applied to a 
singular person, but used to examine a group of peoples who share a common cultural 
experience. The focal group of this examination will be the religious communities of Shia’ Iran, 
adherents to the message of Ayatollah Khomeini. However, this piece will also discuss works of 
authors and social activists, such as Simin Daneshvar, whose works, while not manifestly 
religious, share a focus on the themes of justice and martyrdom. 
The first facet of communal identity which will be explored is the significance of justice. 
In an attempt to understand the entrance of justice into the Iranian communal identity, an 
exploration of some of the roots of justice in Persian religious history is necessary. The following 
is an examination of the development of justice as a religious narrative, beginning with the 
creation story of Zoroastrianism, Iran’s most ancient religion. 
9[CHAPTER 2] The Concept of Justice in Iranian Religious History 
and Literature
The Roots of Justice in Iran
The conception of justice as a major tenant of Iranian identity can be traced to the early 
doctrines of Zoroastrianism, one of the world’s oldest recorded faiths. Zoroastrian theology 
revolves around the deity of creation and wisdom, Ahura Mazda, and his opposition, Ahriman. 
According to believers, Ahura Mazda created the earth, elements and mankind. The entirety of 
creation was manifest following a series of seven singular events: the conception of sky, water, 
earth, plants, animals, man and visible fire. Ahriman did not aid in the Ahura Mazda’s creation 
process but instead took on the role of the deity of destruction and hostility (Moore pp. 199-203).  
Here, the battle between good and evil as a central religious narrative is born. For much of the 
good that Ahura Mazda created, Ahriman developed an evil counterpart. For example, he
brought illness and death into the world, thus allowing for and causing the suffering of mankind. 
As the deity of all that is good, Ahura Mazda is not “the author of anything evil…,” and 
therefore all that is evil and all that brings suffering is attributed to Ahriman (Moore p. 203). 
Until the final battle, when Ahura Mazda returns and defeats Ahriman definitively, the 
good of the world must suffer the evils espoused by the destructive deity. Thus, according to the 
Zoroastrian narrative, it is only when Ahriman is defeated that good will prevail over evil 
(Moore p. 180). The wait for the final battle can be considered a defining element within the 
Zoroastrian quest for justice—the outcome of this battle is decided. As believers of the 
Zoroastrian faith understand that in the final war, good will rise triumphant, followers need not 
worry about the state of the earth following Ahura Mazda’s return. Justice will be restored when 
Ahura Mazda returns the world to a state of order and rids all evil from the earth (Moore p. 180). 
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However, until the final battle occurs, evil will continue to permeate the earth. Because of this, 
the struggle for earthly justice remains very much alive until the restoration of complete justice. 
It should be noted that justice, as a religious as well as social concept, is evident only in 
light of the existence of opposition. If injustice were absent from humanity, so too would human 
understanding of justice be lost. In Zoroastrian theology, Ahura Mazda can be viewed as a divine 
manifestation of complete righteousness, and thus, absolute justice.  On the contrary, Ahriman 
represents the opposing force of injustice. Because Ahriman brought injustice into the world, 
justice cannot be completely realized until he is defeated in the final battle by Ahura Mazda 
(Moore pp. 203, 224). Like the Zoroastrian theology, later religions developed an acute 
understanding of the war between good and evil and the journey to justice.3
The struggle between good and evil as a theological ideology has persisted through the 
ages. Judaism, Christianity and Islam welcomed the doctrine of this moral conflict as a core 
principle of humanity (Encyclopedia Britannica). With the passage of time, the understanding of 
the war between good and evil materialized. Some religious sects took this doctrine quite 
literally while others considered the war to be an internal contestation. In the case of Islam, this 
concept can be discussed in light of the doctrine of Jihad, or “The Struggle” (Encyclopedia 
Iranica). The doctrine of Jihad has come to be one of the most misunderstood, and in some cases, 
manipulated elements of Islamic theology. Whereas the Western media at large portrays the 
doctrine of Jihad as an exclusively physical battle—for example, referencing Jihad exclusively as 
a call to warfare—the prophet Muhammad offers a different explanation (Mohammad p.87).
According to sources of hadith noted in The History of Baghdad, compiled by a man known as 
                                                          
3 Concepts of justice were not only developed and maintained in the religious sector, though such is the focus of this 
analysis. Dating back to Ancient Mesopotamia, an ideology known as the “Circle of Justice” can be found. As 
described by Al-Ghazali, Persian theologian and jurist, the “Circle of justice” establishes the state as a system of 
social justice, wherein the king, legitimate or not, must act justly toward his people and soldiers (Al-Ghazali). 
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Kitab al-Baghdadi, the prophet Muhammad referred to Jihad as having two components: one 
being lesser, the other greater. The lesser Jihad, as noted by the prophet Muhammad, can be 
considered the physical manifestation of the war between good and evil. On the other hand, the 
greater Jihad signifies the individual’s internal struggle against sin, temptation and unworthy 
pursuits (Kitab al-Baghdadi vol. 13, pp. 493-523). It is the maintenance of a righteous soul that 
constitutes the most important struggle in one’s life, a concept made evident through the title 
attributed to this type of struggle as being “the greater.” 
The description of the greater Jihad indicates that one’s individual battle against sin is a 
lifelong pursuit. Thus, there exists within this doctrine an implication of long-suffering. The 
individual must constantly fight to ward off evil or impurity within, even in the face of hardship. 
Similar to the teachings of Zoroastrianism, as well as Christianity and Judaism, Islam also 
declares that there will be an end to the struggle in which good triumphs over evil. Specific 
beliefs regarding this end differ within the various sects of Islam (Encyclopedia Iranica). It is 
with an understanding of the doctrine of the end of times and the significant consequences of 
martyrdom that the importance of justice in Shia’ Islam is made manifest.  
Justice in Twelver Shia’ Theology 
The majority of Iranian Muslims identify as Twelver Shias. This branch of Islam obtains 
its name from a belief in a series of twelve Imams following the death of the prophet 
Muhammad, all of which were direct descendants of the prophet. In Twelver theology, the last 
Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, went into hiding following the death of his father. It is believed 
that he did not die, but rather “is hidden in a state of occultation, or noncorporeal existence” until 
12
an unknown time when he is expected to return and “usher in a reign of justice…in a world full 
of…injustice” (Bhagat pp. 31-32).4
For Twelver Shias, the wait for Mahdi’s return can be considered synonymous with the 
wait for the restoration of complete justice; as the twelfth Imam will return with the purpose of 
“saving the world” from evil, suffering, and sin it is clear that, according to Twelver Shia’
theology, suffering will remain in the world until Mahdi makes himself known again 
(Encyclopedia Iranica). Hence, Mahdi’s awaited arrival beckons in a return to absolute justice on 
the earth. This concept of justice within Shia’ theology, and Twelver Shia’ doctrine in particular, 
has become a core component of the faith. In addition to the five pillars of Islam recognized by 
both the Sunni and Shia’ community, Shias believe in two “Principles of the School”: the sacred 
nature of Imams and divine justice (Encyclopedia Iranica). These principles serve as core tenants 
of the faith, in line with tawhīd, or “The Oneness of God,” and “ma’ād,” doctrines of the 
hereafter, when it comes to level of importance (Subhani pp. 48, 96). This concept of divine 
justice, or Adl, operates in practice as “an acceptance that Allah is fair” and will not only uphold 
justice but punish those who commit injustices (Richter p.7). The addition of the two “Principles 
of the School” to Shia’ Islamic theology, and the continual observance in the contemporary era 
of the two principles, demonstrates the significance of these doctrines within the majority 
religious community of Iran. No additional doctrines have been considered “Principles of the 
School” nor have any other doctrines gained significance comparable to the original five pillars 
of Islam (Encyclopedia Iranica). 
                                                          
4 It is believed that Mahdi, or the Hidden Imam, will return to the world to establish lasting justice. He will come 
with his main helper, Jesus, Savior of the Christian world, at a time that is unknown to mankind. It is believed that 
there will be several signs proceeding the return of Mahdi, including an outbreak of turmoil, war and massacre and 
the revealing of “a mountain of gold,”  disclosed by the Euphrates river (Inter-Islam).
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As a major tenant of Twelver Shi’ism, justice has come to gain both a communal and 
individualistic meaning. On the one hand, the restoration of complete justice is viewed as an end 
to the suffering of the world, and all believers, through the triumph of good and the return of 
Mahdi. On the other hand, there exists the belief that because good has not yet conquered evil, 
followers of Allah will continually fall victim to the injustices of the world on a personal level. 
As injustice will prevail until the Imam’s return, believers have an individual duty to fight off 
evil and injustice, evident, for example, in the existence of sin and persecution, made clear 
through the doctrine of the lesser Jihad. I will explore Khomeini’s attribution of injustices to 
Reza Shah Pahlavi as a theme within his speeches and lectures, wherein the Ayatollah draws on 
religious understanding of the doctrine of justice.
Islam within Iranian Politics
In order to evaluate justice as a symbol used by Khomeini to encourage mobilization
through religious dialogue, it is first necessary to examine the role of religion within Iranian 
politics. The presence of Islam within the contemporary political sector of Iran is founded upon 
religious-political relations established during the prime years of Zoroastrianism. During the 
Sasanian Empire the influence of Zoroastrianism in politics was especially far reaching. 
Historian Ann Lambton described the link between the faith and governing powers of the 
Sasanian Empire as being so closely linked “that the collapse of one meant the downfall of 
another” (p. 97). In effect, the king stood as the representative of Ahura Mazda on the earth and 
was expected to uphold the justice and demonstrate wisdom on earth; he was considered a 
legitimate ruler, a perception founded in the claim of divine approval (Lambton pp. 97-98). The 
religious influence on the social and political order was so strong, that, as asserted by R.C. 
Zaehner of Oxford University, “the social organism was co-terminous with the Good Religion, 
14
and the two could not be separated” (p. 284). The link between the Sasanian Empire as a political 
and social unit and Zoroastrianism as a religious entity laid the foundation for the role Islam 
would fill in contemporary Iran.
With the rise of the Safavid Empire in 1501 A.D. Shia’ Islam was declared the state 
religion. Conversion to Shi’ism was made mandatory, eventually establishing a widespread 
change in the religious identity of the empire (Stearns and Langer p. 360). Like the Zoroastrian 
faith under the Sasanian Empire, the importance of religion under the Safavids is evident: the 
proclamation of the empire as a Shia’ state and forced conversion shed light on the priority given 
to the establishment of a communal religious identity. During the reign of the Qajar dynasty, 
Shia’ Islam maintained a prominent position, particularly through the role of the ulama (Hairi pp. 
272-273). However, during this time clashes between ulama and the state occurred as a 
consequence to the rising power of the ulama in relation to the Qajar Shahs.5
According to Nikki Keddie of the University of California, Los Angeles, the ulama 
began to openly question the legitimacy of political rulers toward the end of the Safavid Empire 
and into the period of the Qajar Dynasty. Keddie states: 
The ulama’s appeal was rather in the respect in which they were held by the community, 
their control of key institutions like the schools and courts, and in their ideological 
agreement with the majority of Iranians. They were far more respected than secular 
rulers, and when they dared point out that the Qajar rulers were selling Iran and Islam to 
foreign infidels, their appeals were paralleled by the urban population (pp. 310-311).
                                                          
5 One of the greatest evidences of the power of the ulama during this period is found in the Tobacco Protest of 1890. 
Following Nasir al-Din Shah’s major concession of tobacco to Western powers, Shia’ ulama orchestrated a mass 
boycott of tobacco products in protest. The boycott was sparked with the public denouncement of tobacco product 
usage by Iran’s Grand Ayatollah Mirza Shirazi. Sources indicate Mirza Shirazi declared the use of tobacco to be a 
war “against the Hidden Imam” (Blarashk). The impact of the protest was profound, ultimately leading to the demise 
of the Shah’s concession.
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The significant role of Shia’ ulama was maintained throughout the twentieth century, 
although attempts to limit the power of the ulama were present. For instance, Reza Khan, the 
first Shah of the Pahlavi dynasty, attempted to eliminate elements of Shia’ Iranian identity
through the creation of restrictive policies. One such policy prohibited the wearing of the hijab 
by public school teachers in the classroom (Abrahamian pp. 93-94). Known for his attempts at 
westernization, Reza Khan’s pro-western policies alienated not only the ulama but the religious 
masses, a consequence which can be contributed in part to his policies limiting religious 
expression of the individual. These policies which attempted to “curb the power of the ulama,” 
included public denouncement of religious tradition, such as sacred clothing, heavy state support 
of secular courts and “introducing secular education and government supervision of religious 
schools,” moves which contributed to the “alienation of the ulama” (Ruthven p. 93).
When Reza Khan’s son, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, took his seat on the throne, the 
marginalization of the ulama continued. Rising resentment for the Shah and his policies of 
westernization as well as secularization increasingly turned the people away from the monarchy
(Mirsepassi-Ashtiani, p.61). As noted by Ali Mirsepassi-Ashtiani of New York University, this 
resentment for the Shah and his policies was not limited to one group. 
The crisis of cultural identity and sense of alienation were not confined to urban social 
groups. Various sectors of society-youth, women, the professional middle class, and 
intellectuals-experienced some form of dislocation as a result of the rapid transformation 
of Iranian society under the Shah. They, too, voiced their feelings of resentment and 
frustration with the political system (p. 60).
Thus it is clear that by the time Khomeini’s public denouncements of the Shah began, 
advocates of change could be found in various social circles: from secular intellectuals to devote 
Shia’. Spreading the message of a government far different from the Shah’s, Khomeini was seen 
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as a viable vehicle for change (Mirsepassi-Ashtiani p. 67). The Shah’s choice to exile Khomeini
when the Ayatollah began to condemn the government speaks to the power Khomeini had 
secured more than a decade before the revolution and also to the Shah’s perceptions of the 
Ayatollah’s capabilities. The Shah of Iran could have permanently disposed of Khomeini had he 
considered the Ayatollah a significant threat to his power. However, he did not. According to 
Mirsepassi-Ashtiani, treatment of the ulama, including Ayatollah Khomeini, indicates that 
“SAVAK [and the Iranian government] did not take the Islamic challenge seriously” (p. 81). 
From the establishment of the Safavid Empire to the contemporary time, Shia’ Islam has 
maintained a presence within Iranian politics. Eventually, as noted by Keddie, ulama began to 
speak out against national leaders, gaining a voice in the political realm as well as rising respect 
from Iranians frustrated with their current regime. Ayatollah Khomeini’s views on the 
interweaving of religion and politics can be considered somewhat innovative for his time
(Keddie p. 595).6 Khomeini believed in the need for a political, governing state founded upon 
Islamic values: he proclaimed that politics could only be administered and maintained in a just 
manner if the root of doctrine was Islamic jurisprudence and theological understanding. This 
view can be seen in the following excerpt from a speech preceding the revolution:
The only government that reason accepts as legitimate and welcomes freely and happily is the 
government of God, Whose every act is just and Whose right it is to rule over the whole world 
and all the particles of existence (Khomeini p. 170).
                                                          
6 Although not particularly common, select twentieth-century Muslim scholars pushed for the interweaving of Islam 
and politics. One of the most important scholars in this discourse is Ali Shari’ati. Shari’ati is considered to have had 
a significant impact upon intellectuals leading up to the Iranian Revolution of 1979. He taught that “Shi’iah, as a 
political movement, is the true expressions of the teachings of Islam,” and that “Personal sacrifice, ‘martyrdom,’ and 
a permanent struggle are crucial” (Ismael and Ismael, p. 609). Shari’ati’s  ideologies stand alongside many of 
Khomeini’s teachings and have undeniably played a role in the development of intellectualism leading up to the 
revolution. The ideologies of Islam as a political movement ultimately resulted in the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, while the important role of martyrdom is a main portion of this analysis. 
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Khomeini’s message indicates that a government which is not “of God” is not legitimate. The 
Ayatollah’s belief that Islam would be the means through which the most legitimate form of 
government was constructed explains his call for the creation of an Islamic Republic. Given the
growing public dissatisfaction in national leadership under the Shah, Khomeini’s suggestions for 
a new mode of government were in a position to be well-received.
The narrative of justice was not limited to religious theology. In the years leading up to 
and following the Iranian revolution, justice was a theme of some of the most prominent pieces 
of poetry and literature published by Iranians. In the next few pages, I will examine two pieces of 
written art which share a theme of justice, tying the works to the larger call for change.
Justice as a Literary Theme
Those familiar with the Iranian Revolution of 1979 are familiar with the remarkable 
poetry of the time. Perhaps one of the most famous poems of the time, written following the 
ousting of the Shah, is the lyrical piece, “Hamrah Sho Aziz.” Written by Samila Ebrahimi and 
translated by Saeed Honarmand, this poem turned to song references the injustice manifest in the 
suffering of the Iranian people. 
Join us, friend!
Join us, friend!
Don't stay alone in pain,
Because this shared pain
Will never be remedied
Divided, divided.
The difficulties of life
for us
The difficulties of life
for us
Without a joint struggle
Never will become easy.
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Don't stay alone in pain,
Because this shared pain
Will never be remedied
Divided, divided.
The difficulties of life
for us
The difficulties of life
for us
Without a joint struggle
Never will become easy
The poem describes a communal suffering and makes a direct appeal for action in the 
cause of justice: “Join us, friend!” There exists within this piece an implicit understanding that 
everyone is suffering from the injustice of the times; the universality of this piece makes clear 
the claim that no one is free from the reach of evil. The words of the poem invoke a sense of 
community among the readers, referencing an element of a shared identity which the author 
asserts exists. Although the implication, that all are suffering together from injustice, is clear,
hope remains that this injustice can be terminated. The piece does not end with the contention 
that the difficulties of injustice “will never become easy.” Rather, it is asserted that these 
difficulties can be made easy “with a joint struggle.” The changeable nature of the injustices the 
Iranian people are suffering, according to the poem, mark this type of injustice as, at least in part, 
temporal. Because the struggle against injustice will find no resolution on the universal scale 
until the return of the hidden Imam, it must be understood that the notion of justice represented 
in this piece refers most prominently to a type of injustice which can in fact be remedied. Thus, 
this piece suggests that for the Iranian people there is a way out of their troubles. 
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The troubles, or injustices, referenced throughout “Hamrah Sho Aziz” are not unique to 
the poem. In fact, the 1960s and ‘70s saw a focus on the themes of justice and progression within 
literature. Simin Daneshvar’s novel, Savushun contains as a major theme the prevalence of 
injustice in the world and the consequences thereof. Written in 1969 amid the revolutionary 
fervor, Savushun can be seen as a reference to and symbol of the significant nature of justice in 
pre-revolution Iranian society. Savushun follows a Shirazi couple, Zari and her husband, Yusof, 
at the close of the Second World War. Russian and British occupation of Iran ignites new 
tensions within the nation. While select Iranians welcome the occupation, seeing it as means of 
growth for the Iranian economy through foreign intervention, Yusof stands as an adamant source 
of opposition. He sees the occupation and, in effect, progressive westernization of Iran, as an 
oppressor of the Iranian people, accusing supporters of the imperialists, even dear friends of his, 
as forsaking the nation and “milking peasants” for their profit (Daneshvar p. 61). Yusof refuses 
to let the tribal groups in his community perish due to a lack of supplies, which are now being 
sent to foreign troops. He is committed to justice on the individual level, distributing food and 
supplies to dozens of local families (Daneshvar p. 75). Throughout the novel, Yusof can be seen 
as a symbol of persisting justice in his community. 
The parallelism between the Iran of Savushun and the pre-revolutionary nation is drawn, 
in one respect, with the concept of occupation. Although physical occupation by armed forces 
was not present, Iran was occupied by western ideologies and agendas nonetheless. This type of 
occupation invokes in Yusof the sensation of being alienated in one’s own nation, a feeling 
which many advocates of political and social change felt in the years leading up to revolution
(Mirsepassi-Ashtiani p. 60).
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At its core, Savushun is a novel about justice. Kamran Talattof of the University of 
Arizona describes Savushun as a piece falling into the category of “committed” or politically and 
socially motivated literature. As expressed by Talattof, “committed literature...refers to the works 
of writers who dedicate themselves to the advocacy of certain beliefs, especially those related to 
political and ideological efforts to bring about social reform.” (Talattof p.4). He goes on to 
discuss the role women, like Daneshvar, played in the movement of “committed literature,” 
noting that during this time women moved away from a focus on gender issues to explore social 
change on the national level (Talattof p.4). Savushun, as a reflection of the injustices of the 
westernization of Iran under Reza Shah Pahlavi, can be considered a symbol of anticipated 
freedom. The longing that Yusof, in particular, demonstrates for the return of Iran to her people 
reflects the longing present in many intellectuals and later religious Iranians during the second 
half of the twentieth century.
Talattof describes Savushun as a novel of social activism, in his piece “Iranian Women’s 
Literature,” stating:
The heroes of Savushun take all the steps necessary to accomplish their most honorable goal: 
helping the movement. In this novel, too, personal interests, religion, love, family, and life in 
general are all secondary to the importance of one's social and political responsibilities. Life and 
the movement are linked only through death, and death itself becomes another subject of praise. 
The figurative expression of this devotion to the social movement and the glorification of heroism 
and martyrdom is the constitutive element of the language system in Danishvar's Savushun. (p. 
535).
While, as Talattof suggests, religion is “secondary to the importance of one’s social and political 
responsibilities” in Savushun, the presence of the themes of justice and martyrdom link the novel
with the religious movement of the revolution. Additionally, the Iranian Revolution was not only 
one of religious change. As was discussed through an examination of the Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, the consequences of the revolution were not only religious but also 
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social and political. Daneshvar’s novel sheds light on a growing social movement among 
intellectuals which would eventually contribute to the outbreak of revolution (Salehi pp. 2-3).
Like justice, the concept of martyrdom was a notable element of discourses in the 
growing social and religious movements preceding the revolution. The presence of martyrdom in 
both religious and literary circles is apparent in an examination of the roots of martyrdom in 
Iranian culture and society. The next portion of this analysis will focus on martyrdom in Shia’ 
Islam and the impact of the martyrdom of Imam Hossein on Persian literature and contemporary 
rituals, elements contributing to the shaping of a communal identity. 
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[CHAPTER 3] The Concept of Martyrdom in Iranian Religious 
History, Literature and Contemporary Ritual 
The Roots of Martyrdom in Iran
Unlike the theme of justice, the significance of martyrdom does not appear as a core 
component of Zoroaster’s teachings. It is, therefore, with the rise of Islam, and most specifically 
Shia’ Islam, that the concept of martyrdom penetrates the Iranian religious community. 
Certainly, a primary source to examine when exploring martyrdom in Islamic theology is 
the words of the prophet Muhammad. According to a hadith compiled by Muhammad al-
Bukhari, the prophet Muhammad made reference to the role of martyrdom in religious 
observance. The hadith reads as follows: 
[53] The Prophet said, “Nobody who dies and finds good from Allah (in the Hereafter) would 
wish to come back to this world even if he was given the whole world and whatever is in it, 
except the martyr who, on seeing the superiority of martyrdom, would like to come back to the 
world and get killed again (in Allah’s Cause)”
[54]…by Him in Whose Hands my life is! I would love to be martyred in Allah’s Cause and then 
get resurrected and then get martyred, and then get resurrected again and then get martyred and 
then get resurrected again and then get martyred (Sahih al-Bukhari 4:52:53-54)
The statements above depict the eternal rewards awaiting those who lose their lives
defending the cause of Allah. The prophet Muhammad describes a paradise at hand for these 
martyrs, one which is far superior to all other rewards granted in the afterlife. The eternal 
recompense awaiting the martyr is so grand, in fact, that the prophet himself declares he would 
act as a martyr for the faith time and time again. However, it is important to note that the prophet 
does not make a call for believers to seek martyrdom; he does not insist upon his followers 
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losing their lives in such a matter, but rather speaks in a general sense about the eternal 
consequences attributed to those who will ultimately lose their life.7
Although some claim that martyrdom is referenced in the Qur’an, defending such a claim 
is not an easy task. The verses usually pointed to as references of martyrdom generally mention a 
loss of life in defense of Islam, but at least in the case of the untrained reader, are not explicit in 
meaning. The following is a scripture most commonly associated with martyrdom by the general 
public:
And never think of those who have been killed in the cause of Allah as dead. Rather, they 
are alive with their Lord, receiving provision…(Qur’an 3:169, Sahih International 
Translation). 
Losing one’s life for the “cause of Allah” is referenced in the verse above. However, this 
verse does not attempt to persuade believers to become martyrs nor does it offer an explanation 
for precisely what constitutes death in the name of Allah and what does not. Such an explanation, 
in fact, is not found within the Qur’an, nor does any verse call for believers to ensure the loss of 
their lives as martyrs. The somewhat inexplicit phrasing of the Qur’an, coupled with a diversity 
of audience, has led to the creation of a wide variety of explanation and interpretation (Ezzati p.
1). Adding further to the complexity of dissecting the role of martyrdom as laid out in the Qur’an 
are complications with translation. As a particularly significant example, the word for martyr, 
shahīd, derives from the Arabic word shahāda, meaning ‘witness,’ and this is this definition that 
is most often used in Qur’anic translation. The definition of a shahīd, as a witness of the faith, 
                                                          
7 Here, it is important to take a step back and consider the subject of the prophet’s message. During the lifetime of 
the prophet Muhammad his followers were heavily persecuted and many were killed. Many resisted Islam as a faith 
which rejected the long-held religious traditions, such as the belief in polytheism. Given the immense persecution 
that the followers of the prophet were constantly facing, it is likely that these verses make reference most 
specifically to those who died while following the faith during the prophet’s lifetime. In recent years, martyrdom has 
become a method utilized by extremists to take the lives of others, hoping for and believing in an eternal reward. 
Recognition of extremists beliefs as compared to the beliefs of the Muslim community in general is, thus, most 
necessary. 
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has transformed over the years to also incorporate the role of martyrdom, in that one who dies 
defending the cause of Islam loses their life as a witness to the faith (Ezzati pp. 1-3). Evolution 
of translation and differences in interpretation should, therefore, be taken into account when 
examining the role of martyrdom in the Qur’an. 
As the above records of the Qur’an and hadith suggest, martyrdom was present with the 
rise of Islam, though the context of such is not necessarily clear. Many followers of the prophet 
were killed for refusing to defy their faith and standing in defense of their beliefs (“Early 
Converts to Islam” p.4). Documented within The Life of Muhammad, a translation of Ibn Ishaq’s 
Sirat Rasul Allah is the story of the first martyr of Islam, a slave woman by the name of 
Sumayyah bint Khayyat. Although little is known about Sumayyah, it is believed that she was 
killed by her master after refusing to abandon her newfound belief. Distressed by her death, and 
the persecution of many of his followers, the prophet Muhammad spoke comfort through a 
hadith, saying “patience oh family of Yasir, for you are destined for paradise” (Guillaume p. 
145). Persecution toward followers of Muhammad continued throughout his lifetime and 
persisted even after his death with contemporary times proving to be no exception. 
One of the most well known accounts of martyrdom in Persian literature is found in Abu 
I’Qasim Ferdowsi’s tale of “Siavash,” a story within the epic of The Shahnameh. Siavash is 
depicted by Ferdowsi as an ideal man, having been taught from a young age “what wise speech 
is,” as well as what “justice and injustice are” (Ferdowsi p.217). When Siavash has proved a 
capable and ready leader, he leaves his life of training and is presented to King Kavus, his father. 
Although Siavash is welcomed by his father, his time at court is not without issue. His 
stepmother, Sudabeh, acts as a temptress, encouraging Siavash to be her lover. In response to her 
request Siavash proclaimed, “God forbid I should lose my head for the sake of my heart, or ever 
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be so disloyal to my father as to forget all…wisdom” (Ferdowsi p. 222). Even though Siavash 
rejects the advances of Sudabeh he continues to suffer as a result of the injustices of the world, 
personified largely by Sudabeh, who falsely accuses him repeatedly. After one such false 
accusation, Siavash is forced to ride on his horse through fire. His innocence is proven when he 
emerges “unscathed,” an act which causes “nobles and commoners” to rejoice and pass “on the 
news to one another that God justified the innocent” (Ferdowsi p. 217).
In an effort to be rid of the troubles caused by Sudabeh, Siavash leaves his father’s home 
and becomes a soldier. Unwilling to submit to the inhumane charges of his father -who orders 
mass executions and goes back on his word during wartime- Siavash relocates to the land of 
Turan where he finds temporary happiness (Ferdowsi pp. 228-270). In the end of the story, 
Siavash is killed by Turanian leaders jealous of his success in the land. Siavash’s death is 
followed by immediate darkness which “obscured the sun and moon” (Ferdowsi pp. 272-273). 
Ferdowsi writes of the reality of injustice in the act of this execution: 
I turn to right and left, in all the earth
I see no signs of justice, sense, or worth:
A man does evil deeds, and all his days
Are filled with luck and universal praise;
Another’s good in all he does—he dies
A wretched, broken man… (p. 273)
In Ferdowsi’s description of Siavash’s death, the link between injustice and martyrdom 
as established within the Persian literary narrative can be seen.8 Although he lived an ideal life, 
                                                          
8 Ferdowsi explains that a “green tree sprang up” from the place “Siavash’s blood had been spilt” (p. 279). The 
image of a plant growing from earth soaked with the blood of a martyr remains alive in Shia’ legend. In the 
graveyards of Iran, headstones of the martyrs can be identified with the presence of a red tulip. As the Shia’ legends 
goes, a red tulip will sprout from ground soaked in the blood of a martyr. The image of the red tulip has become a 
symbol for mourning as well as committed remembrance to the cause for which the martyr perished. Some believe 
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“good in all he does,” Siavash suffered the consequences brought about by a lack of justice upon 
the earth. He becomes a martyr in that he died, “an innocent man,” one who others have “seen no 
sin” in—including his enemies (Ferdowsi pp. 271-272). Like Siavash, Shia’ Muslims recognize 
many martyrs who are believed to have died in innocence: the most well-known being the 
Prophet Muhammad. Perhaps the most respected and mourned martyr in Shia’ Islam, save 
Muhammad himself, is Imam Hossein. The narrative of his life and martyrdom are important 
components to contemporary ritual remembrance of the Imam, as will be discussed in this piece.
The Life and Martyrdom of Imam Hossein
The prophet Muhammad left no instructions for the selection of his successor. Following 
his death the Muslim community was torn as to whom lawfully, and legitimately, should be the 
next leader of the faith. The first caliph following Muhammad’s death, Abu Bakr, was nominated 
by a group of his peers. Abu Bakr appointed the second caliph, Umar. The third caliph, Uthman, 
was chosen by a “consultative council,” and following his death, the prophet Muhammad’s son-
in-law and cousin, Ali, gained the title of caliph (Ismael and Ismael p.602). Thus it is apparent 
that even immediately after the prophet’s death there was division amongst believers as to how a 
leader should be chosen. The selection of the first caliphs following led to a great schism in the 
Muslim community. Many believed that leaders of the faith should be elected to their position by 
their peers while others felt only direct descendants of the prophet Muhammad were worthy and 
eligible for the post. Disputes over relative closeness to the prophet increased the subjectivity of 
the debate, which only led to the widening of the gap between followers. Eventually, the 
disagreements and tension which rose within the caliphate debate led to the outbreak of civil war. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
that the word “Allah” as written on the Iranian flag is even formatted to mirror a red tulip as a sign of the centrality 
of martyrdom to the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Moezzi). 
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The Muslim community, which under Muhammad had sprouted and grown as a unified body, 
was divided into two groups: the Sunni and the Shia’ (Melton pp. 2610-2611). 
The divide between the Sunni and Shia’ heightened in the years following the death of 
Ali. As the branches grew apart, they began to solidify their religious, political and social 
identities. One of the most defining moments in the creation of Shia’ identity can be traced to the 
desert city of Karbala (Nakash pp. 161-165). The incident, which has since been known as The 
Battle of Karbala, resulted in the martyrdom of Imam Hossein, one of the most prominent and 
historic leaders of the Shiite community. 
Hossein ibn Ali was born in the year 626 A.D. to Fatima, the daughter of the prophet 
Muhammad, and her husband, Ali, who is considered the first Imam of Shia’ Islam. It is said that 
the prophet Muhammad held the newborn child and prophesized that Hossein “…will achieve 
martyrdom…” adding that “…God will create a nation who will mourn Hossein until the Day of 
Judgment” (“The Third Imam” p.1). Naturally, his birth as a descendant of the prophet placed 
him in a special spiritual position. The prophet Muhammad is believed to have told Muslims to 
remember Hossein and his example long before Hossein’s actions would prove significant to the 
faith, and to have taken Hossein, in his childhood, to places of worship (“The Third Imam” p.2)
Thus even as a child, the future Imam was singled out as one who would give his life in defense 
of Islam. 
Political unrest accompanied Hossein’s growth and development and as a young adult he 
avoided heavy interactions with government turmoil. Instead, Hossein spent his time speaking 
the message of, what he considered to be, true Islam and serving the impoverished in Medina 
(“The Third Imam” pp. 1-2). When the third caliph passed and Ali gained the position of 
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caliphate, political turmoil turned to warfare. For what is believed to have been the first time in 
his life, Hossein served as a commander in the military during the Battle of Jamal, defending his 
father’s position as legitimate (“The Third Imam” p.2). This turning point in Hossein’s life is 
significant. His choice to avoid engagement with politics and civil strife seems to have been a 
conscientious decision; given the widespread unrest associated with the reign of the first three 
caliphs, and Hossein’s important presence as a descendant of the prophet, it must be true that 
Hossein was aware of the troubles within the Muslim community at large. His choice to 
eventually engage in warfare, to take up the sword in physical activism, emphasizes the
significance of the situation. (“The Third Imam” p. 2). For Hossein, his father was the legitimate 
successor to the prophet Muhammad and thus the valid caliph of true Islam. The belief in the 
valid authority of his father warranted a physical commitment to the defense of Ali’s legitimacy. 
The conclusion of Hossein’s first encounter with warfare, the Battle of Jamal, did not
mean resolution between the conflicting parties. In subsequent years several battles were fought
rooted in the legitimacy of Ali as caliph and later over more temporal matters, such as political 
authority and rule. It is believed that Hossein continued to serve alongside his brother as a 
commander (“The Third Imam” pp. 2-3). Following the death of his father Hossein was declared 
the third Imam by the Shia’ community. However, his leadership was not accepted by all 
supporters of the prophet and the Umayyads selected their own caliph to lead the people, 
Muawiyah. In 680 A.D., the son of Muawiyah, Yazid I, became the second Umayyad caliph, 
following the death of his father. Yazid’s relations with the third Imam were brittle from the 
start.9 Any hope of improved relations between the Umayyad community and the third Imam 
                                                          
9  Muawiyah waged several battles against Hasan, Hossein and their supportive community. Muawiyah saw Hasan 
as a threat, given it was widely believed that Hasan was the rightful successor to Ali. Eventually, Muawiyah and 
Hasan signed a peace contract. The most well known condition of the peace contract was drafted by Hasan. It 
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were diminished from the very beginning of the rule of Yazid. Against the advice of his father, 
Yazid’s first demand as caliph in regards to the Imam was the Hossein sign an Oath of 
Allegiance (Winters p.5). The Imam refused. Having endured years of battle and turmoil with his 
father, and believing that Yazid’s reign as caliph was illegitimate, Imam Hossein understood that 
to sign such an oath would be to turn his back on true Islam. Imam Hossein’s refusal to submit to 
the will of Yazid resulted in his final standoff, the Battle of Karbala (“Imam Husayn and His 
Martyrdom” p.7).
In the year 680 A.D., Imam Hossein and his followers while traveling to Kufa made 
camp in a land known as Karbala. It is said that the Imam, upon learning of the name of the 
location, stated that this place had been named for “torture and pain” (“The Third Imam” p. 10). 
Shia’ Muslims now consider his words to be prophetic. Only two days after setting up camp, 
Imam Hossein and his followers were met by the governor of Kufa’s army, led by a man by the 
name of Hurr ibn Yazid Riyahi. Hurr ordered Imam Hossein to relocate his camp away from 
river bank. In the heat of the desert, the command was lethal (Encyclopedia Iranica). As Imam 
Hossein and his followers fell victim to unquenchable thirst, Yazid sent his military to meet 
Hurr’s soldiers. Yazid’s army had grown massive in size, though the Shia’ narrative suggests that 
several of Yazid’s men defected in order to serve the Imam, including the commander, Hurr
(Encyclopedia Iranica). One by one, the Imam’s followers were killed until, in the end, only the 
relatives of the Imam and Hossein himself were alive.10 The Imam was the last to die and was 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
prohibited Muawiyah from naming a successor and instead demanded that the next leader be chosen by the 
community. Muawiyah did not abide by this contact and named his son Yazid, as his successor. In addition, the 
contract did not stop Muawiyah from continued attempts to assassinate Hasan. Ultimately, Muawiyah succeeded in 
killing Hasan through use of poison. In Shia’ Islam, Muawiyah and his son Yazid have come to be seen as evil-doers 
who defy true Islam (“The Third Imam,” pp. 2-7).
10 It is said that prior to the outbreak of battle, the Imam shared his water with Hurr’s army. Shias believe that his act 
of generosity also ensured his death; had the Imam and his followers not displayed kindness toward their enemies, 
perhaps thirst would not have weakened their bodies and enabled, or at least quickened, their destruction. However, 
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forced to watch his own family die before him (“The Third Imam” pp. 10-12). The cruelty the 
Imam endured in the last days of his life offers one explanation for the level of grief felt by 
believers even today. The pain the Imam endured is not likely to go unnoticed by those who 
deeply respected him as a leader and representative of the divine. The following is an evaluation 
of factors contributing to the impact of the Imam’s death on the Iranian Shia’ community. 
When considering the impact of Imam Hossein’s death, it is necessary to consider the 
aforementioned two “Principles of the School” unique to Shia’ Islam. The first, an understanding 
of the sacred nature of the Imams, sheds light on the significance of Imam Hossein’s death. The 
understanding that Hossein was one of the few chosen to lead the Shia’ community after the 
Prophet’s reign demonstrates just how important the Imam was to his followers and why he 
would remain so even today. 
The second “Principle of the School” is that of divine justice. This, too, aids in an 
understanding of the impact of Imam Hossein’s death on the Iranian identity. The death of Imam 
Hossein is a tangible example, a moment in history that Shias throughout the ages can pinpoint, 
of the injustices endured in defense of the faith. Fourteen hundred years after the Imam was 
killed Iranians continue to mourn his death. The reality of this persistent mourning suggests that 
there is a piece of the contemporary communal identity which still shares an intimate link with 
the religious history of the Shia’. Yitzhak Nakash of Princeton University discusses the presence 
of Imam Hossein’s martyrdom in the communal Shia’ identity. He states: 
The traditions….that elaborated on the episodes connected with the battle of Karbala created a 
religious symbol out of Hossein's suffering and martyrdom. This symbol established powerful 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
the Imam is praised even today for his charitable character, a sign to believers of his legitimacy (“The Third Imam,” 
p.10).
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and long-lasting moods and motivations among Shi’is, reinforcing their Shi’i communal sense 
and distinct sectarian identity… (p. 161). 
Nakash goes on to describe the martyrdom of Imam Hossein as “a symbol of sacrifice in 
the struggle (jihad)…for justice and truth against wrongdoing and falsehood (p. 162). With the 
martyrdom of Imam Hossein as a symbol “of sacrifice for justice,” the link between the earthly 
injustice and martyrdom can be seen. This connection is not necessarily limited to 
commemoration of the Imam’s death. As Nakash suggests, the incident at Karbala is a symbol 
which has established “long-lasting moods and motivations” among the Shia’ community, 
therefore implying an applicability to the modern day. 
Martyrdom as a Literary Theme 
The impact of martyrdom upon Persian literature is not limited to “Siavash.” A return to 
Simin Daneshvar’s Savushun illuminates the presence of martyrdom in literature leading up to 
the 1979 revolution. Determined to stand against the imperialists and protect his community, 
Yusof continually refuses to meet the demands of the West. In his refusal to promote injustice, 
Yusof demonstrates a sense of conviction, one which may be considered an individual 
determination to be just. An example of this can be seen in the following scene: Not long before 
Yusof’s death, Zari weeps over the injustices of life, saying “Why should there be so much 
misery?” and asking Yusof to stay out of danger. To her pleas, Yusof responds, “Someone must 
do something” (Daneshvar p. 232). His persistence in the quest for justice makes him an 
important figure in pre-revolution Iran. It is this same persistence, this same quest for the 
maintenance of Iranian pride and heritage, which ultimately leads him to his death. 
One of the final scenes of the novel is that of the martyrdom of Yusof. On a trip into 
town, Yusof is assassinated by those he had for so long opposed, the same individuals who 
32
sought to take his land and to give none to the poor of his own community (Daneshvar, p. 249).
Following his death, Zari is informed by the authorities that she is not permitted to hold a burial 
procession (Daneshvar pp.290-293). Nevertheless, Zari proceeds to hold the procession in honor 
of her husband and in defiance of the authorities. During the procession, mourners gather in large 
numbers and are eventually forced to disperse by authorities. Zari has no choice but to bury her 
martyred husband alone, at night, demonstrating that even in death Yusof receives no justice 
(Daneshvar pp. 293-306).
Daneshvar’s choice to have Yusof die as a martyr illuminates the injustices good people 
are forced to endure, a theme within Persian literature referenced also with the death of Siavash: 
“Another’s good in all he does—he dies…”(Ferdowsi p. 293).  Another link between the story of 
Siavash and Savushun can be found in the title of the latter. The name “Savushun,” is a 
transformation of “Siavash” (Encyclopedia Iranica). The parallelism between earlier tales of 
martyrdom and Daneshvar’s contemporary novel suggests an awareness of the role of martyrdom 
in Iranian cultural history as well as a persistence of the theme of martyrdom in Iranian literary 
culture. 
The concept of martyrdom as a facet of the Iranian communal identity is not only 
supported trough themes of major literary pieces. Each year, on the tenth day of the month of 
Muharram, Muslims across the globe observe Ashura. For Shia’ Muslims, Ashura can be 
considered a public demonstration of the impact martyrdom has played on the communal 
religious identity. The following is an exploration of the rituals of Ashura practiced in 
contemporary Iran. 
The Role of Martyrdom in Contemporary Iran 
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The varying reasons for observance between the Sunni and Shia’ Muslims demonstrate 
distinct differences in theological doctrine. Sunni Muslims celebrate Ashura through a traditional 
fast. It is a time in which the Sunni community offers gratitude and sacred commemoration for 
God’s rescue of Moses from Egypt, following the tradition of the Jews. It is, in all respects, a day 
to rejoice and express gratitude for liberation under Allah. The term “celebration” cannot be 
appropriately applied to the Shia’ observance of Ashura (Melton pp. 210-211).  
For the Shia’ community, Ashura marks the last of ten days set aside for mourning in 
remembrance of the martyrdom of Imam Hossein. The days of mourning, which fall on the first 
ten days of the month of Moharram, are filled with public displays of grief and a shared 
understanding of a tragic history and persecution (Nakash p. 164). Reenactments of the battle of 
Karbala through passion plays, known as Ta’zieh, invoke occasions of communal sorrow. 
Although the audience undoubtedly understands that the Ta’zieh is simply a reenactment of 
historic events, their public display of grief illustrates that, while the martyrdom of Imam 
Hossein took place more than a millennium ago, the agony which these plays invoke in the 
observant audience is fresh (Nakash p. 165). This persistent agony, according to hadith compiler 
Mustadrak al-Wasail, was referenced by the prophet Muhammad, as follows:
Surely, there exists in the hearts of the Mu' mineen [the believers], with respect to the martyrdom 
of Hossein, a heat that never subsides (Mustadrak al-Wasail vol. 10, p. 318). 
The concept of a “heat that never subsides” speaks volumes about the impact martyrdom has had 
on the shaping of the Iranian identity; the memory of the martyrdom lives on, fourteen hundred 
years after the Imam’s death. Iranian sociologist, Ali Shariati, is quoted to have said “Every 
month is Moharram, every day Ashura, and every place Karbala” (Abrahamian p. 112). In his 
History of Iran Abrahamian calls this saying a “slogan…of fighting for social justice and 
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political revolution” (p.112). The slogan indicates the level of persistence demonstrated in the 
call for remembrance of the Imam’s death. It was eventually adopted by the religious, including 
Ayatollah Khomeini, written on banners and displayed during protests and demonstrations
(Khosronejad p.25).
Dedication to this cause of commemoration has not been limited emotional participation. 
Self-flagellation, while not particularly common, can be seen each year in the Iranian observance 
of Ashura.11 This practice is almost exclusively made up of male participants who break open 
their skin in order to demonstrate their willingness to bleed for Imam Hossein. The act also 
serves as a physical reminder of the pain suffered by the third Imam. Acts of self-flagellation 
generally occur in public processions, wherein the more reserved beat their chest with their 
hands, whilst others tear the flesh off their backs with chains and whips (Nakash pp. 174-176). 
The session is an outward demonstration of pain, mourning and devotion. 
The emphasis placed on the martyrdom of Imam Hossein is sustained through continued 
public commemoration. The performances of Ta’zieh, along with acts of self-flagellation and 
communal weeping, maintain the memory of the Imam’s martyrdom in the public sphere.
Through persistent remembrance of the Imam’s death Ashura has become more than a time of 
memory and respect; these ten days of mourning are symbols of the impact martyrdom has had 
upon the shaping of the Iranian communal identity (Nakash p.161). 
                                                          
11 In recent years, acts of self-imposed mutilation have been a more common occurrence in the neighboring nations 
of Lebanon and Bahrain, as well as within the subcontinent of India. That is not to say that self-flagellation does not 
occur in Iran as a means of commemorating the death of Imam Hossein, but rather that these practices have been 
somewhat tamed over the years. In fact, recent restrictions from the government have limited the acts of self-
flagellation permissible under the law, claiming that such acts “defame Shia’ Islam,” and “project a negative 
imagine of Shi’ism to outside believers” (British Broadcasting Company).
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[CHAPTER 4]  Justice and Martyrdom in the Messages of 
Ayatollah Khomeini
Ayatollah Khomeini and Justice
In a comparative analysis of the Iranian Revolution, Keddie observes that by 1978 “…
the ayatollah had become, even for many secularists, the symbolic revolutionary leader” (Keddie 
p. 589). Khomeini’s ability to reach various classes and groups of people, including secularists, 
allowed the Iranian Revolution to be, according to Charles Kurzman of the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill, the world’s most popular revolution.
[The Iranian Revolution] appears to have been the most popular revolution in history in the sense 
that at least ten percent of the Iranian population participated, compared to little more than one 
percent for the 1776 American, 1789 French, or 1918 Russian revolutions (p. 121). 
Khomeini’s success as a leader encouraging mobilization can be traced in part to his 
ability to attract the attention of the lower working class. Mohammad M. Salehi, former faculty 
of sociology at the National University of Iran, describes the increase in revolutionary fervor 
within the urban and rural classes through religious affiliation as one of Khomeini’s greatest 
strides as a revolutionary leader.  Speaking of the shift in the revolutionary push from secular 
intellectuals to the lower class, Salehi states: 
The contribution and power of the small, but highly influential, new middle class was becoming 
insignificant compared to the urban class and the rural people…[The demands of the middle class 
secularists] were overstepped by an Islamic fundamentalist revitalization movement that attracted 
millions…to the realm of revolutionary politics (pp. 2-3). 
The remainder of this paper will explore Khomeini’s rise to the status of “the symbolic 
revolutionary leader,” utilizing the works of the Ayatollah, and in particular his speeches, as 
evidences (Keddie p. 589). The analysis will be focused on Khomeini’s use of justice and 
martyrdom, previously explored elements of the Iranian communal identity, as fuels for 
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mobilization. The ability of the use of justice and martyrdom to inspire the Iranian people to 
mobilize will also be explored.
Khomeini began to publish political critiques of the Pahlavis as early as the year 1921, 
though his denouncements of the monarchy became more frequent with the outbreak of the 
Second World War (Bhagat p. 33). In the sixties, his speeches began to attract substantial 
audiences. Following Reza Shah Pahalvi’s introduction of a series of economic, social and 
political reforms known as the “The White Revolution” in 1963, Khomeini “made violent 
speeches against the Shah before 100,000 people … in Qum” (Bhagat p. 33). His speeches 
ignited demonstrations across Iran from audiences who related to his message. Ultimately, these 
demonstrations led to the massacre of a “number of students from Fayziya Madrasa” in late 
March of 1963 wherein “several students were killed and dozens arrested” (Khomeini p. 16). 
This massacre marks what Khomeini’s supporters considered to be the first of the revolution. 
Forty days later, Khomeini publically addressed this massacre, making reference to injustices 
suffered in defense of the faith. The following is a portion of the Ayatollah’s declaration:
Our crime was defending the laws of Islam and the independence of Iran. It is because of our 
defense of Islam that we have been humiliated and brought to expect imprisonment, torture and 
execution. (p. 174)
Fifteen years before the outbreak of revolution, Khomeini spoke openly about the threat 
of the monarchy against Islam, as evident in his declarations above. The Ayatollah’s belief and 
claim that Islam is threatened by the Shah mirrors the long-standing religious narrative of the 
battle between good and evil. Viewed through this narrative, Islam can be considered truth and 
therefore the icon of complete righteousness. On the other hand, the Shah, according to the 
Ayatollah, is the opponent of truth. Khomeini established his view of the Shah as an enemy of 
the faith through his naming of the Shah “as the evil Yazid” (Bhagat p.37). 
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On February 19, 1978, over a decade after the Fayziya Madrasa massacre, Khomeini 
delivered a speech in memory of those killed. In the speech, Khomeini makes reference to the 
sufferings of the Iranian people:
We are faced with so many difficulties; I cannot possibly tell you all of them. God knows, the 
problems that are referred to me by the people! They tell me, for example, ‘We want to build a 
water-storage tank at such-and-such place, because there the people have no water.” Now if 
people don’t have water, do they have electricity? Do they have paved roads? They have 
nothing!’ (Khomeini p. 223)
With the use of an inclusive subject, “we,” Khomeini allows himself to share in the pain 
of the people; he becomes one with the masses, uniting Iranians together with a shared ambition 
to end the injustice and suffering brought about by the reign of the Shah. Khomeini’s efforts to 
unite the masses against the western imperialists were not limited to the Iranian public. Many of 
his speeches were directed at broader audiences. For example, on February 6, 1971, Khomeini 
delivered a speech “to the Muslims of the world gathered together on….the pilgrimage to 
Mecca” (Khomeini p. 195). During this speech, Khomeini expresses a duty among Muslims for 
the exchange of knowledge in order to gain understanding of the injustices suffered by believers 
at the hands of imperialists: 
The [Muslims] of each country should…present a report concerning their own state to the 
Muslims of the world, and thus all will come to know what their Muslim brothers are suffering at 
the hands of imperialists (p. 197).
There is in this expression of duty a call for communal understanding among believers of the 
injustices suffered by Muslims across the world. In response to this self-declared duty, Khomeini 
informs his audience of the actions of the Shah and his regime. He states: 
Invoking Islam and pretending to be Muslims, they strive to annihilate Islam, and they 
abolish and obliterate the sacred commands of the Qur’an one after the other…I extend 
my hand to all people of Islam….to break the chains of captivity” (pp. 197-198). 
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Again, by asserting that the Shah and his administration “pretend to by Muslims,” 
Khomeini draws a line between what he defines as true Islam and what the Iranian government 
represents. In this way, Khomeini separates the Iranian Shia’ communities from the Shah, 
placing the Shah as the enemy of the faith, and thus by extension, the public (Khomeini p. 177).
The years approaching revolution were spent in exile for the Ayatollah. For more than a 
decade Khomeini lived outside of Iran, though he continued to denounce the Shah and his 
western policies from abroad (Bhagat, pp. 33-37). As tensions between the Iranian people and 
the Shah increased, Khomeini’s influence spread drastically. Followers began to record 
Khomeini’s lectures which were subsequently smuggled into Iran by the thousands. Even when 
abroad, Khomeini spoke of the creation of a new form of government in Iran. He incorporated 
the quest for justice into messages revolving around the formation of an Islamic Republic. He 
began to refer to the transformation from secular to religious rule as the creation of a 
“government of justice,” as seen below:
In order to attain the unity and freedom of the Muslim peoples, we must overthrow the oppressive 
governments installed by the imperialists and bring into existence an Islamic government of 
justice that will be in the service of the people (Khomeini p.49). 
As the above declaration makes clear, the Ayatollah calls for revolution did not end with 
the dismissal of the westernized regime of the Shah. Rather, Khomeini rallied for the subsequent 
establishment of an Islamic Republic, a system he believed would reign in long awaited years of 
legitimate rule in line with Islamic principles and teachings. Justice was therefore not only a 
driving force for the overthrow of the monarchy but also a motivating factor in the establishment 
and acceptance of an entirely new form of government. Salehi describes this approach to 
political change as follows: 
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In Shiite ideology, revolution does not mean the restructuring of a new form of society, but an 
uprising of the believers to correct the wrong, to put things back on the right track, to reestablish 
the rule provided by God descended through his prophet (p.49).
In the case of Iran, it was not enough for the Shah to be removed from power. The rise of a 
legitimate authority was a necessary step toward the obtainment of temporal justice, and for 
Khomeini, legitimacy in government could only exist within the confines of an Islamic system 
(Khomeini p. 49).
In asserting that justice could only be reached through the formation of a legitimate 
Islamic Republic under the leadership of an Imam, Khomeini reaches one of the most intimate 
corners of a person’s being: the spiritual makeup of an individual. By limiting individuals the 
right to religious expression, the Shah did not only claim the religious freedoms of Iranians but 
also their human dignity. Simin Daneshvar, makes reference to her husband’s return to religion 
prior to the revolution as a means of reclaiming his dignity. She states:
If he turned to religion, it was the result of his wisdom and insight because he had previously 
experimented with Marxism, socialism and to some extent, existentialism, and his relative return 
to religion and the Hidden Imam was toward deliverance from the evil of imperialism and toward 
the preservation of national identity, a way toward human dignity, compassion, justice, reason, 
and virtue (qtd. by Mirsepassi-Ashtia p.61)
In turning to religion, Daneshvar suggests that her husband also turns toward dignity and 
justice. Daneshvar’s reference to a return to religion as a “way toward human dignity” supports a 
connection between her husband’s religious inclinations and his self-respect. If, as Daneshvar 
implies, religion can be seen as a way toward human dignity then the Shah’s desecration of the 
sacred could logically be said to have a negative effect upon one’s dignity.  Additionally 
noteworthy is Daneshvar’s suggestion that a return to religion served to “preserve the national 
identity,” thereby suggesting that Shia’ Islam is linked to the Iranian identity. The implication of 
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this connection reinforces a communal understanding of the impact of Shia’ theology on the 
Iranian identity.
Through shared understanding of justice, based in large part on a common Shia’ identity, 
Khomeini was able to relate to his audience. His speeches encouraged Muslims from around the 
world to consider the injustices brought about by westernization. The actions of the Shah were 
discussed as a means of circulating his injustice, and according to Khomeini, illegitimate rule 
(Khomeini p. 49). Utilizing the inclusive subject, the Ayatollah included himself as a victim 
when speaking of the Shah’s policies; his self-inclusion allowed him to speak as part of a 
community seeking justice. The theme of justice, and the use of examples of injustice, allow 
Khomeini to remind his audiences of the sufferings the Iranian people, and Shia’ population at 
large, have been made to endure. A point in history which Khomeini returns frequently to as a 
reminder of these sufferings is the Battle of Karbala.
Ayatollah Khomeini and Martyrdom
Alongside justice, martyrdom was a common theme in the messages of Ayatollah 
Khomeini. During the years leading up to the revolution, Khomeini refers frequently and 
specifically to the martyrdom of Imam Hossein. In his speech commemorating the martyrs at 
Qum in 1963, Khomeini calls Imam Hossein, “the great one,” asserting that it is “for the sake of 
[Imam Hossein]” that the Iranian people have suffered (Khomeini p. 174). That same year, 
Khomeini gave a speech on Ashura. In this speech, he compares the actions of Yazid in the 
massacre at Karbala to the actions of the Shah’s regime. He states:
Sometimes when I recall the events of Ashura, a question occurs to me: If the…regime of 
Yazid…wished to make war against Hossein, why did they commit such savage and innocent 
crimes against the defenseless women and innocent children? It seems to me that the Umayyads 
had a far more basic aim: they were opposed to the very existence of the Prophet….A similar 
question occurs to me now. If the tyrannical regime of Iran simply wished to…oppose the ulama, 
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what business did it have tearing the Qur’an to shreds on the day it attacked Fayziya Madrasa? 
We come to the conclusion that this regime also has a more basic aim: they are fundamentally 
opposed to Islam itself and the existence of the religious class…they do not wish any of us to 
exist” (p. 177).
In these words, Khomeini’s comparison between the  Battle at Karbala and the actions of the 
Shah’s regime is clear. The historic battle is not only commemorated by Khomeini but is used to 
parallel the actions of the Iranian government. For Shia’ Muslims, the narrative is a core 
component of Shia’ theology, as previously discussed, and therefore well-known in amongst 
believers. The Battle of Karbala results in the martyrdom of the Imam, his family and his 
followers. With this comparison, Khomeini declares that the government seeks, as did Yazid, to 
dispose of the believers—“they do not wish any of us to exist” (p. 177). 
As the revolution drew near, references to martyrdom evolved into calls for martyrdom. 
A few short months before the revolution, Khomeini called directly for the sacrifice of 
revolutionary advocates, saying “Our movement is but a fragile plant. It needs the blood of 
martyrs to help it grow into a towering tree” (qtd. by Sciolino p.174). The sentiment in this 
statement is clear: Khomeini believed bloodshed would be a necessary sacrifice and proclaimed 
as much to his audience.12 His references to the death of Imam Hossein, as seen through his 
speeches, evolved from commemoration of the martyrs, to the creation of parallelisms, to,
ultimately, calls for his audience to give their own lives for the cause. 
The declarations of Khomeini suggest that the Ayatollah recognized the significance of 
martyrdom within the communal Iranian identity, specifically in regards to the Twelver Shia’ 
                                                          
12 Khomeini’s call for martyrdom and praise of those who died in such a manner did not end with the ousting of the 
Shah. During the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, Khomeini publically praised those who died as martyrs. He is recorded
as having said, “Our leader is that young boy of 12 who threw himself with a grenade under the enemy's tank,
destroying it and drinking the sweet draft of martyrdom.” (Gruber p. 31).
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community. In her memoir on Iran, Elaine Sciolino describes the Ayatollah’s understanding of 
the importance of martyrdom. 
…martyrdom has deep roots in Iran’s Shiite culture, and Khomeini was a master at 
manipulating the homegrown strain of martyrdom and its lust for sacrifice. During a sermon…for 
Muharram in 1963, Khomeini likened the oppression of the Iranian people under the Shah’s 
monarchy to Hosein’s martyrdom. When Khomeini was arrested…men and women wrapped 
themselves in white funeral shrouds as symbols of their readiness to die for him…The first thing 
Khomeini did [when he returned to Iran in 1979] was to fly by helicopter [to the graveyard]…to
mourn the victims of Black Friday. (Sciolino pp.174-175).
After having been exiled for years, the Ayatollah’s return to Iran was marked by a publicized and 
immediate visit to the graveyard of the martyrs. This act suggests an understanding of 
Khomeini’s part of the importance of the martyrs. Through the action of visiting the martyrs,
Khomeini placed himself on the side of the mourners, demonstrating a shared understanding and 
communal grievance for the consequences of injustice. 
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Conclusion
Justice and martyrdom have entered the Iranian identity through a variety of avenues. In 
Zoroastrian theology the narrative of the battle between good and evil is developed. This 
narrative can be seen through Shia’ theology as well and is apparent in the Shia’ understanding 
of divine justice. As previously discussed, the quest for justice is both an individual and 
communal task. Through the doctrine of the lesser Jihad an individual role in this quest becomes 
clear. Following the split between the Sunnis and Shias, the later sect distinguished themselves 
through the historical narrative of the Battle of Karbala and the martyrdom of Imam Hossein. 
The massacre of the sacred Imam during this battle stand as a tangible reminder to Shia’ 
Muslims of the injustices suffered by believers. 
The literature surrounding the revolution also serves to illuminate the prevalence of 
justice in the Persian literary narrative and thus communal identity. Ayatollah Khomeini utilized 
justice as a goal for revolution, largely through expression of shared understanding. Through the 
establishment of an Islamic Republic, Khomeini promised his audience that a new era would 
begin. This era would occur under the existence of an Islamic Republic, the only government 
Khomeini claimed could be legitimate. The early Shia’ narrative provided Khomeini with the 
ability to label the Shah as an enemy of Islam, which he did, as discussed, by drawing parallels 
between the martyrs of Imam Hossein and Reza Shah’s government. In this way, Khomeini 
aided in the revitalization of a religious awakening. The Shah no longer was seen as a ruler 
simply unsuited for the post; through Khomeini’s influence he became an illegitimate authority 
who suppressed the people, and more importantly, suppressed Islam. Reza Pahlavi became a man 
who stood to diminish everything for which Imam Hossein had died. Khomeini’s naming of the
Shah as an enemy of Islam was effective and can be seen in his ability to mobilize the masses. 
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As Salehi states, it was the religious lower class which eventually transformed ideas of change to 
action of rebellion—a class which previously had strayed away from political engagement (p.2).
The concepts of injustice and consequential martyrdom awoke in the peoples’ 
consciousness a newfound understanding of each reality, as is evident in themes from major 
literary works of the time. Eventually, Khomeini’s most faithful audience would be called to 
shed their blood if needed in the battle between good and evil. Khomeini’s references to 
martyrdom became calls to action, resulting in a continuation of the tradition of praise and 
remembrance for those who had given their lives in defense of the faith. 
For thirty-four years, the government created as a result of the Iranian revolution has 
withstood the test of time. As tensions with the Shah rose, masses came together, experiencing 
and holding to a shared identity. To this day, that identity can still be seen, though without the 
consistency of demonstrations and protests it exists in a quieter, less obvious manner. The ties 
which brought the masses together under Khomeini’s calls for action have, like the revolution, 
withstood the test of time. Justice continues to play a pivotal role in the Iranian identity just as 
the martyrdom of Imam Hossein is commemorated year after year on Ashura. And in the vast 
graveyards of the martyrs red tulips still sprout from the earth, a symbol of those who have fallen 
for the faith. 
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